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Abstract
Much of the literature on interest rate pass through assumes banks set retail
rates by observing current market rates. We argue instead that banks anticipate
the direction of short-term market rates when setting interest rates on loans and
deposits. Including anticipated rates - captured by forecasts of short-term market
rates or futures rates - in an empirical model requires a detailed consideration of
the information contained in the yield curve. In this paper we use two methods to
extract anticipated changes to short-term market rates - a level, slope, curvature
model and a principal components model - at many horizons, before including them
in a model of retail rate adjustment for four retail rates in four major euro area
economies. Using both aggregate data and data from individual French banks,
we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant role for forecasts of market rates in determining interest rate
pass through; alternative speciﬁcations with futures information yield comparable
results.
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One of the lessons learned in the recent ﬁnancial crisis concerns the critical impor-
tance of the mechanisms banks use to ﬁnance their lending. Banks, which had
become progressively more reliant on short-term market funding for their lending
activities and less reliant on their deposit base, found their ability to lend was
closely connected to the availability of funds in the money markets. Banks sub-
stantially changed their funding model a decade before the ﬁnancial crisis emerged
(Borio, 2008, Mizen, 2008, and Llewellyn, 2009) making them more dependent on
short-term market-based ﬁnance up until the point that the ﬁnancial crisis oc-
curred. We might conclude that the consequence of this change would be a close
correspondence between the rates that banks charged to lend to each other and
the rates that they oﬀered to households and ﬁrms, but this is not the case.
Figure 1 plots four retail rates for a representative euro area country (Germany)
showing time deposits, short- and long-term loans to enterprises and mortgages
from 1995-2007, while Figure 2 plots four market rates of interest, the 3-month and
12-month EURIBOR rates and 2-year and 10-year bond yields. As market rates
rise and fall so it appears retail rates follow suit, but closer inspection reveals that
retail rates do not follow market rates to the peaks and the troughs. While there
is a reasonably close correspondence between rates at which banks can borrow in
the interbank market and rates oﬀered to retail borrowers, banks smooth the rates
to some degree. This observation notwithstanding, most recent papers on interest
47026 and the EU Commission through MRTN-CT-2006-034270-COMISEF. An early version
of this paper was discussed at an ‘expert meeting’ at the European Central Bank, Frankfurt.
For their comments we thank Philip Bond, Satyajit Chatterjee, Mike Dotsey, Loretta Mester,
Mark Watson, Jonathan Wright, Cheng Zhu and seminar participants at the Federal Reserve
Bank, Philadelphia, the Bank for International Settlements, Singapore Management University,
Bank Negara Malaysia and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. We also thank the Directorate
General of Statistics of the Banque de France, especially Director General M. Jacques Fournier,
and Sylvain Goutheron and J´ er´ emi Montornes for providing the French bank data on which the
disaggregate analysis is based. The opinions expressed in this paper are ours alone and should
not be taken to represent the views of the Banque de France or any of the National Central Banks
of the Eurosystem or the European Central Bank. Responsibility for any remaining errors rests
with us.
2rate pass through have argued the opposite and assumed that there is a close
contemporaneous relationship between rates for retail customers and the current
market rates at the same maturity.1 According to these conventional models, the
rates faced by new business should have fully reﬂected the current changes to costs
of borrowing on the money markets even at the peaks and the troughs.
We argue otherwise. There are two reasons why banks smooth out variations in
market rates in the interest rates oﬀered to their customers. First, there is a cost of
changing interest rates, which deters banks from making changes in one direction
that may need to be reversed after a short duration; this also stops them from
continuously changing rates. It is not the purpose of this paper to focus on this
issue, but it is necessary to acknowledge that for a variety of reasons, adjustment
to rates is not costless. Second, banks seek to anticipate the future direction
of interest rates, particularly when they are setting rates for many periods, and
even more so when they will have to reﬁnance the loans that they make in the
future, possibly several times. This is the primary focus of our paper because the
current empirical literature does not discuss how projections of market rates might
inﬂuence banks when they set retail rates. Expectations only feature in these
papers to separate anticipated and unanticipated changes to current monetary
policy. As we show, it is relatively straightforward to allow for the inﬂuence of
future expected rates, and this is the contribution of our paper.2
1Examples of excellent papers in this tradition include Baugnet et al. (2007), de Bondt
(2002, 2005), de Bondt et al. (2005), Borio and Fritz (1995), Cotarelli and Kourelis (1994),
De Graeve et al. (2007), Ehrmann et al. (2001), Ehrmann and Worms (2001), Fuertes et
al. (2008), Gambacorta (2008), Heﬀernan (1997), Hofmann and Mizen (2004), Kleimeier and
Sander (2006) Kok-Sørensen and Werner (2006) and Sander and Kleiemeier (2004). These papers
make two important contributions to the literature. First, they oﬀer empirical evidence on the
equilibrium relationship between retail and contemporary market rates, and second, they explore
the dynamic adjustment around the equilibrium allowing for asymmetry, nonlinearity and the
eﬃciency of markets across countries with a common source of shocks to market rates.
2The literature does not consider the impact of future money market rates on current retail
rate setting, but in many respects it searches for evidence of market eﬃciency. Krueger and
Kuttner (1996), Kuttner (2001), Bernoth and von Hagen (2004) consider eﬃcient markets and
Kleimeier and Sander (2006) have used futures prices to make allowance for anticipated and
unanticipated monetary policy changes on the adjustment of retail rates. Kleimeier and Sander
(2006) show there is a greater response to anticipated monetary policy changes measured by
3Our paper diﬀers in three distinctive respects from most empirical studies of
interest rate setting that have largely concentrated on a contemporaneous rela-
tionship between retail and market rates with closely matched maturities, and no
adjustment costs. First, we oﬀer a forward-looking model in which banks form ex-
pectations about future rates when setting interest rates. Second, it assumes that
banks cannot always perfectly match the maturity of loans to sources of funds.
Third, the model allows for reﬁnancing, and introduces costs of adjustment to
retail rates.
We begin by oﬀering a simple theoretical framework in which ﬁnancial institu-
tions look forward when setting interest rates. Financial institutions face incentives
to anticipate the direction of future changes to market rates in order to avoid mak-
ing costly changes to retail rates that may subsequently need to be reversed. Banks
also anticipate future market rates because they cannot match maturities perfectly
between loans and sources of funds, and therefore need to anticipate the costs of
reﬁnancing their loans at various points in the future. This oﬀers a theoretical
basis for the relationship between retail and future market rates of interest.
We then use this theoretical structure to motivate the inclusion of expected
money market rates in our dynamic adjustment model of retail rates for data
aggregated across banks within each country and for groups of individual banks
in a representative country (France).3 We do this using two methods described in
Diebold and Li (2006). First, we generate forecasts of market rates using a dynamic
Nelson-Siegel representation of the yield curve. Second, we forecast future rates
using principal components extracted from the covariance matrix of market rates at
various maturities. Using forecasts of changes to 1-month and 3-month maturities
for EURIBOR market rates we then use the information on anticipated future
changes to market rates to predict changes in four diﬀerent retail rates in the four
of the largest economies of the euro area (France, Germany, Italy and Spain) at
interest rate futures than to unanticipated changes.
3If the future level of market rates enters the empirical speciﬁcation for interest rates this
can either be included in the determination of the long-run relationship or it can be included as
future expected changes in money market rates in the dynamic model.
4various forecast horizons.
The data used in the estimation comes from two sources. The ﬁrst comprises
variables at a monthly frequency from January 1994 to July 2007 for France, Ger-
many, Italy and Spain from the harmonized monetary and ﬁnancial institutions’
interest rate (MIR) dataset. This is what may be called the aggregate dataset.
The second dataset consists of interest rates (also at a monthly frequency) taken
from a sample of individual French banks. This disaggregation enables us to check
whether the results derived from the ﬁrst dataset are a consequence of the aggrega-
tion involved in constructing the MIR statistics using individual bank-level data.
For France the disaggregate results conﬁrm those from the aggregate dataset. Sim-
ilar analysis could in principle be undertaken for the remaining countries but we
are constrained by access to the relevant data which are available to us only for
France.
We select the appropriate lag structure for the models using Bayesian informa-
tion criteria and report the degree of interest rate pass through in each case. We
are able to test the signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients on the forecasts of future changes
to money market rates in our model at diﬀerent maturities. When we compare
our results from forecasting models with an alternative model using EURIBOR
futures, we ﬁnd that the results are very similar, both in terms of the pass through
coeﬃcients that we obtain, and the signiﬁcance of the variables that anticipate
future changes to money market rates. Our results provide evidence that previ-
ous modelling strategies, using only contemporary market rates to explain retail
rates, neglected a large amount of relevant interest rate information in the yield
curve about future short-term rates. Our approach acknowledges the uncertainty
about future market rates which banks face when they set retail rates, and by
forming forecasts of future market rates banks are able to take into account their
expectation of future rates in the current retail rate setting decision.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief literature
review. Section 3 provides a theoretical basis for including forecasts of future
5market rates, Section 4 gives an outline of our econometric methodology, and
Section 5 gives our data sources. Section 6 reports the results, with Sections 6.1
and 6.2 presenting the results for the aggregate data and Section 6.3 the results
for bank-level data. Section 7 concludes. All tables and ﬁgures are given at the
end of the paper and a brief data appendix lists the data sources used.
2 Literature on Rate Setting In Europe
The recent literature has addressed several contributions to the question of rate
setting by banks which we discuss brieﬂy below.
2.1 Equilibrium relationships between retail and market
rates
Many of the studies cited in the introduction have used time series of weighted
averaged interest rates by broad product category such as deposits, loans and
mortgages; others have employed individual rates for identiﬁable banks, products,
and product tiers within countries. Some of these papers have used the oﬃcial
reﬁnancing rate as the benchmark, others have used a closely related short-term
money market rate such as a EURIBOR rate. The equilibrium relationship be-
tween retail and money market rates modelled in these papers is assumed to be
contemporaneous and does not include forecasts of future money market rates.
This can be justiﬁed by appealing to a ‘cost of funds’ argument, which states that
the marginal cost of funds is best captured by the market rate with the closest
maturity to the retail product. A similar and related argument for this approach
is that the monetary or ﬁnancial institution will try to avoid mismatch in assets
and liabilities by funding a loan with market ﬁnance at a similar maturity e.g. a
money market instrument or bond issue, and therefore the rate or yield on that
instrument gives the benchmark rate.
However, this approach is subject to several potential criticisms. First, it is not
always possible to ﬁnd a close match between retail and market rates for empirical
6analysis because the retail rate categories can be quite coarse - a problem that was
particularly acute with the National Retail Interest Rate (NRIR) dataset, but is
less serious for the Money and ﬁnancial institutions Interest Rate (MIR) dataset.
Besides, market rates exist only at certain maturities, and while interpolation is
possible to infer rates at intermediate maturities, none of these interpolated rates is
available on a single market instrument. A better deﬁnition of the rates on diﬀerent
bank deposits, loans and mortgages is made possible through the MIR statistics.
Authors using recent data have been able to select the market rate to match
more closely the maturity of the retail rate, but this is far from being a perfect
solution. Kok-Sørensen and Werner (2006) overcame some of these problems by
using higher deﬁnition MIR data, creating synthetic market rates from the existing
actual market rates at given maturities and by selecting benchmark rates using
correlations within pre-deﬁned maturity bands appropriate for the retail rate in
question. Their work represents one of the most sophisticated approaches to the
issue of benchmark rate selection and is one that we follow in this paper, using
their data series. But instead of matching maturities exactly, we are able to allow
for the maturities to be mismatched, making reﬁnancing necessary for interest rate
adjustment. We explain this in more detail below.
Second, even when ﬁnancial institutions seek to match maturities they may
do so imperfectly, and may be exposed to movements in short-term market rates
if they are forced to borrow to correct for illiquidity or attract additional funds
to their deposit base, both of which are sensitive to short-term interest rates.
Swap rates could not be expected to close maturity mismatches perfectly. Barbier
de la Serre et al. (2008) recognize that hedging and securitization through the
markets are not captured in this ‘cost of funds’ approach, even when it is done
in a very sophisticated way. They use the median initial maturity on corporate
loans, commercial loans and mortgages to match with bond yields rates at 2, 5 and
10 year maturities. They augment this approach with the use of common factors
to explain omitted variables in the relationship between the retail rate and the
7market rate. Their data are drawn from banks in France from January 2003 to
July 2007.
Third, the literature has tended to select the ‘most appropriate’ market rate
by a pre-selection method using the correlation between the retail rate in question
and alternative market rates, rather than by strict maturity matching, as noted by
Sander and Kleimeier (2004) and Kok-Sørensen and Werner (2006). This method
can overstate the extent of pass through since the highest correlation delivers the
highest pass through coeﬃcient among the options available.
2.2 Dynamic adjustment around equilibrium
The conventional basis for thinking about the interest rate setting behavior of
banks has been the banking ﬁrm model based on the Monti-Klein framework
(c.f. Monti, 1971, Klein, 1971).4 It supposes that banks establish the markup
(markdown) of loans (deposits) over a risk free rate, which is determined by a
contemporaneous oﬃcial or money market rate, and the extent of the markup
(markdown) is then a function of market power. If in the Monti-Klein model it
is assumed that markets are perfectly competitive then pass through should be
full, symmetric and relatively swift in response to changes in oﬃcial rates, but few
studies have found this to be the case. The Monti-Klein model is able to allow
for more realistic features of ﬁnancial markets, including imperfect competition,
asymmetric information, and switching costs, and with these features, it implies
that full pass-through is a long-run phenomenon, with deviations from this ’equi-
librium’ occurring in the short-run.5 For these deviations to persist there need to
be frictions that impede adjustment.
4Although this model is forty years old, it is still the conventional wisdom in the graduate
level textbooks on microeconomics of banking, and was used by Barbier de la Serre et al. (2008)
to expain the relationship between retail and market rates in the long run. Extensions of this
framework are provided by Elyasiani et al. (1995), and Kopecky and VanHoose (2012).
5de Bondt et al. (2005) provide a systematic summary of short-run and long-run pass through
estimates from the literature (1994-2004) in Table 1 of their paper. In most cases the long run
pass through, for the majority of countries and for the euroarea as a whole, is 100 percent, or
very close to that ﬁgure.
8Assessment of the dynamic adjustment of interest rates has reﬂected asymme-
try and non-linear adjustment in response to oﬃcial rate changes (c.f. Heﬀernan
(1997), Hofmann and Mizen (2004), Sander and Kleimeier (2004), De Graeve et
al. (2007), and Fuertes et al. (2008)). Studies of time series of weighted averaged
interest rates and panel of data for individual ﬁnancial institutions interest rates
have found strong evidence in favor of nonlinearity and heterogeneity as ﬁnan-
cial institutions negotiate imperfections in ﬁnancial markets, switching and menu
costs.
Their models make adjustment around an equilibrium between retail and money
market rates that is contemporaneous and does not include forecasts of future
money market rates. We argue in this paper that the model ignores the real-
istic possibility that banks use their own expectations of future market rates to
minimize the uncertainty they face when setting retail rates.
2.3 Market eﬃciency in the euro area
Many studies of interest rate setting in the euro area have looked at the eﬃciency
of the transmission of information across countries at a point in time. For ex-
ample, the comparison of retail rate setting behavior of banks in diﬀerent euro
area countries in response to a common monetary policy action includes Mojon
(2000), Ehrmann et al. (2001), Ehrmann and Worms (2001), Worms (2001), Weth
(2002), Kleimeier and Sander (2006) and Sander and Kleimeier (2004). These pa-
pers consider whether convergence in ﬁnancial markets has occurred as economic
reform has taken place through a common monetary policy and due to competi-
tion between banks across the euro area. The majority view is that pass through
is strongly inﬂuenced by banks’ ﬁnancial characteristics and the banking industry
structure in each country and this dominates the inﬂuence of monetary union or
competitive forces across the euro area as a whole. de Bondt et al. (2002), de
Bondt (2005), Kok-Sørensen and Werner (2006), Kleimeier and Sander (2006) and
Sander and Kleimeier (2004) show that the degree of pass through continues to
9be substantially diﬀerent across the euro area despite a common monetary policy.
We therefore expect to ﬁnd diﬀerences in the degree of pass through for countries
in our sample, and diﬀerences in the extent to which expected future market rates
aﬀect retail rate setting.
3 Theoretical basis for a forward-looking model
3.1 Monti-Klein model
The starting point for the analysis of interest rate pass through is the Monti-Klein
model, ﬁrst developed by Monti (1971) and Klein (1971). We use this framework to
consider the microfoundations of the problem. Assume there are N banks, indexed
n = 1,...,N, using the same technology to hold deposits, Dn, for the households
and supply loans, Ln, to borrowers, who are homogenous from the perspective
of the bank. We can suppose that there is only one type of deposit and loan
product for the present. The banks face a downward sloping demand for loans
and an upward sloping supply of deposits. In the simplest case the bank could use
deposits to fund loans, and generate proﬁts by creating a diﬀerential between loan
and deposit rates, but it could also lend (or borrow) on an interbank market. If
we consider interbank loans, Mn, then in terms of quantities for each bank
Dn = Ln + Mn
Taking the supply of deposits as D(rD) and the demand for loans as L(rL) ,
which can be more conveniently written inversely as rrD(D) and rrL(L), the proﬁt
of the nthbank is












o is the optimal loan volume of all other banks, D∗
o is the optimal deposits of
all other banks. mr is the market rate if interest on interbank loans and C(Dn,Ln)
10is a cost of administration of banking services. The unique Cournot equilibrium
has optimal bank loans and deposits for each bank of L∗
n = L∗/N and D∗
n = D∗/N.

























D(D∗) are the slopes of the loan and deposit functions, and
C′
L(D,L) and C′
D(D,L) are the marginal administrative costs of an additional loan
(deposit), which if we assume costs are linear C(Dn,Ln) = µDDn + µLLn results
in the addition (subtraction) of a markup (markdown), µL (µD).
Under perfect competition N ! 1, we see rr∗
L = mr+ µL and rr∗
D = mr  µD.
Banks have no market power and markups (markdowns) reﬂect only marginal
administrative costs. Under monopolistic competition with small N we ﬁnd that
the markup (markdown) on retail rates rrL and rrD is larger than the marginal
administrative cost since rr′
L(L∗) < 0 and rr′
D(D∗) > 0. Hutchison (1995) has a
general equilibrium model in which the banking ﬁrm sets the retail rate of interest
equal to the market rate of interest adjusting for the number of banking ﬁrms,
the reserve requirements imposed by the monetary authorities, and parameters
from the household preferences. Like the Monti-Klein model he ﬁnds the degree
of competition, related to the number of banks, inﬂuences the degree that interest
rate pass through deviates from one. In this framework, and that of Hutchison,
there are no adjustment costs so we would expect any change in administration
costs or the degree of competition to be reﬂected immediately in retail rates. Banks
would keep retail rates and market rates in long run equilibrium at all times.
Elyasiani et al. (1995) and Kopecky and VanHoose (2012) have a similar model
in which they maximize bank proﬁts which are adjusted to allow for quadratic
adjustment costs. Their model depends on the interest rates on loans, deposits and
the money market (securities), and the quantities of deposits and loans received
11by the banks. They also make the point that the spreads between loan or deposit
rates and money market rates depend on competition (market power).
3.2 Two-period model
To introduce dynamics we need to introduce a friction that would keep the ﬁnancial
intermediaries from making full adjustment to every market rate change. This
could be the ﬁxed cost of administration involved in providing loans, mortgages and
deposits. When a market rate change occurs the ﬁnancial institution incurs a cost
of adjustment to the contracts of borrowers to reﬂect the change in market rates
(see Mester and Saunders, 1995). It also incurs a cost for communicating the rate
change to its customers.6 Besides these actual costs of adjustment, there may be
disincentives to make adjustments to rates if the deviation is small and insuﬃcient
to cause customers to switch to other lenders or deposit takers (Neumark and
Sharpe, 1992). Hence rates can be ‘sticky’ so long as the deviation of the current
retail rate from the optimal rate, given the movement in market rates, is small.
We take the model of the ﬁnancial intermediary to be the same as the previous
section, but now we have adjustment costs. We can consider a simple model based
on the Ball and Mankiw (1994) to introduce ﬁxed menu costs, c, of changing
interest rates. For ﬂoating rate products such as deposits, short-term loans and
variable rate mortgages the retail rate would change for new business and existing
customers; for ﬁxed rate products such as time deposits, ﬁxed rate loans and ﬁxed
rate mortgages, the new rate would apply to new business only.7 We suppose that
there are two periods, and that there is no cost of adjustment in the even periods,
but a menu cost, c, in the odd periods. Banks can observe current interbank
market rates, which has a maturity h (h = 1 in this simple two period case, and
6In July 2010, the British Bankers’ Association estimated this ﬁgure to be the cost of sending
13.5 million personal letters to banks’ customers each time rates change. In 2008 there were ﬁve
negative rate changes, involving 67.5 million letters, which would have incurred a cost of $33.75
million for the banking sector in the UK. Some banks have relied on full page advertisements in
national newspapers to communicate rate changes on their products.
7In our empirical section both the MIR data and the data for the individual French banks
refers to new business rates.
12the maturity of the retail rate is H = 2). Banks must form an expectation about
the second period market rate; market rates follow a random walk. Retail rates
are set for a two period horizon, unless the bank incurs the ﬁxed cost of changing
rates. The bank minimizes the quadratic loss function in the deviation of actual
retail rates from its desired level. For convenience we drop subscripts on retail
rates, and allow the markup to be positive or negative according to the nature
of the retail product i.e. loans have a positive markup, deposits have a negative
markup.
Hofmann and Mizen (2004) showed that there would be an incentive for ﬁnan-
cial institutions not to adjust retail interest rates, rrt+i, in response to observed
or expected changes in market rates, mrt+j in the two periods j = 0,1. We refor-
mulate the result in terms of s, which is an index counting the number of periods
that retail rates must be reﬁnanced: since H = 2 and h = 1, s counts two periods









where j = 0,1. The term µ is the markup. Using the result in Ball and Mankiw
(1994) that rate adjustment should occur if the cost of the change is less than the
cost of no adjustment. We can see that the ﬁnancial intermediary minimizes a loss




















If the required adjustment to rates in the context of a two-period model were













then banks would rather avoid the ﬁxed cost of changing rates rather than make
small adjustments to rates. Once we introduce an adjustment cost we can consider
13the dynamics of adjustment of rates around the long-run equilibrium relation, but
the two-period horizon for rate setters is somewhat restrictive.
3.3 Multi-period model for retail interest rates
In this section we generalize the result above in order to emphasize the importance
of forward-looking behavior and forecasts of future interest rates. In contrast with
the model presented in the previous section, our model here has many periods.
Instead of averaging the market rates with equal weights on current and future
market rates, we use a discount factor γ to place a higher weight on recent market
rates and a lower weight on market rates further into the future.
Second, if at any point in time the retail interest rate is changed, the ﬁnancial
intermediary incurs a small ﬁxed cost, c, of making the change. In the simpler
model above the ﬁnancial intermediary can make changes to rates costlessly in even
periods, but incurs a ﬁxed cost c when making a price change in an odd period.
Here there is a cost whenever any change is made to the retail rate irrespective of
whether the period is odd or even. We make this alteration because it is realistic
to assume that resetting the retail rate incurs a cost to the ﬁnancial intermediary
(the ﬁxed cost of administration and communication) at any time that changes
occur to market rates that had not been expected. This cost will be incurred for
new business irrespective of whether the product has a ﬁxed or ﬂoating rate.
A third change is introduced to allow for the possibility that the maturity of
the market rate and the retail rate do not necessarily match. Many empirical
models impose a matching maturity, but there is no reason for the maturity to
match exactly. Banks may desire maturity matching, but markets may not oﬀer
funds at a maturity that actually matches the maturity of the mortgage or loan.
We used this notation in the model above, but here it is explicitly recognized as
H > h. This is of great importance in the empirical analysis, since the estimation
methodologies have to be adapted to allow for possible mismatches. As before s
counts the number of periods that it is necessary to reﬁnance the loan.
14Market rates represent the cost of additional funds for the ﬁnancial interme-
diary, assuming that deposits have been fully used to provide existing loans, and
at the point in time that the retail rate is posted it attempts to forecast future
money market rates in order to set the retail rate at a level that represents the
discounted cost of new funds for the period of the loan, H. Hence the optimal
retail rate set at the beginning of the period for an H-period retail product, e.g.
a 30-year mortgage, is then given by:







where γ is the discount factor, Et+j is the expectations operator, and mrt+j+sh(h)
is the h-period future money market rate. This determines the ex-ante optimal
retail rate, but ignores the eﬀects of shocks to the interest rate. Once we allow for
shocks to cause the actual future rate to deviate from the expected future rate,
there will be conditions under which it is optimal to reset interest rates, even if
there is a ﬁxed cost of doing so.
At any point in time over the horizon of the retail product, the ﬁnancial insti-
tution can reset the rate for an H-period retail product at a small cost, c. It is
not our purpose in this paper to estimate the size of this cost, but we include it
because its existence ensures that the bank does not remain permanently in equi-
librium8. There is only an incentive for the bank to adjust its retail rates in any
period if the loss of not adjusting is higher than the menu cost, but this depends
how large is the diﬀerence between the retail rate and the newly preferred level
for retail rates, based on its knowledge of shocks to market rates, its view about
future market rates and the cost of adjustment. The loss function the ﬁnancial
intermediary minimizes in each period j is
8If the purpose of the paper were to explore the costs of adjustment it would be more appro-























































The ﬁrst term is the deviation from long-run equilibrium, the second term
represents the average expected change in the money market rates H periods into






























s=0 γsh(mrt+sh+j+1(h)   mrt+sh+j(h))
]
.
The point we wish to emphasize with this model is that the decision to make
a change to retail rates on new business (and existing business where rates are
variable) is determined by considering expected changes to future market rates
but most models ignore the eﬀects of anticipated changes in short-term market
rates on retail interest rates.
Other authors have made a similar theoretical point. Elyasiani et al. (1995) and
Kopecky and VanHoose (2012) argue that a theoretical model similar in structure
to the Monti-Klein model but with quadratic adjustment costs justiﬁes equations
for deposit and loan rates that depend on current, past and future market rates
of interest. Elyasiani et al. (1995) conclude that the correct speciﬁcation for
the deposit supply and loan demand equations should include forecasts of money
market rates, and in empirical work they provide an ARIMA forecast of interest
16rates which are then found to be signiﬁcant in these equations. The focus of the
Elyasiani et al. paper is to establish whether deposit and liability decisions of
banks are jointly (in)dependent, and the role of forecasts in the model is a by-
product of this analysis. Kopecky and VanHoose (2012) extend this argument
to interest rates to show that current retail rates on loans and deposits should
depend on expected future market rates, as well as the extent of competition in
the retail market. They then suggest that futures might provide an indication of
the commonly held expectation of future market rates.
Similarly, Hofmann and Mizen (2004) consider a model similar to ours, but fo-
cused on two-period adjustment and with forward-looking terms deﬁning the zone
where no adjustment is worthwhile. The model considers the potential asymmetry
and nonlinearity of the adjustment process in a backward-looking speciﬁcation of
the error correction model, where the error is the discrepancy between the actual
retail rate and some desired retail rate, based on the market rate and a markup.
Only when future anticipated rates are likely to result in a widening of the gap
between the actual and desired retail rate do ﬁnancial institutions incur the cost
of adjusting rates.
The main contribution of our paper is to explore in detail the role of interest
rate forecasts in pass through equations. As we explain in the section below, we
provide a number of alternative forecast methodologies to evaluate the importance
of future expected market rates on the current retail rate decision of banks. We
demonstrate, using three diﬀerent tests, that forecasts have a signiﬁcant input
into the current retail rate decision. We also provide empirical conﬁrmation of
the argument proposed by Kopecky and VanHoose (2012), that futures may be a
useful measure of expectations of market rates.
174 Econometric Methodology
4.1 The Conventional View
The conventional model adopted by the literature (see inter alia de Bondt et al.,
2002, de Bondt, 2005, Kok-Sørensen and Werner, 2006, Kleimeier and Sander,
2006 and Sander and Kleimeier 2004) makes use of the long run equation
rr
∗
t(H) = µ + βmrt(H), (2)
where the equilibrium retail rate rr∗
t(H) of maturity H is determined by the con-
temporaneous money market rate mrt(H) of the corresponding maturity and a
constant mark up µ. However, as retail rates are not aggregated using exact ma-
turities, the matching of retail and market rates is only an approximation using
the nearest available maturity in market rates.9
Given the equilibrium retail rate rr∗
t(H), the error-correction model can be
estimated for the actual retail rate, rrt(H)






l=1 φl∆rrt−l(H) + εt.
(3)
Substitution of (2) into (3) gives





l=1 φl∆rrt−l(H) + εt.
The coeﬃcient β is interpreted as the long-run pass through determining the equi-
librium relation, and the coeﬃcient α determines the speed of adjustment to devi-
ations from the equilibrium. The model does not have any forward-looking terms,
since all the variables are lagged by one period or more. It therefore clearly di-
verges from the model we presented in section 3. In addition, because the model
9Some authors such as de Bondt (2002) depart from this process by using correlation analysis
to match a retail rate with a market rate at a selected maturity and lag, and in this case the
maturity of the retail and market rates are not necessarily the same.
18(2) - (3) relies on the matching of retail and money market rates of the same ma-
turity, where the money market rate is interpreted as the marginal cost of funds,
it ignores the maturity mismatch faced by ﬁnancial intermediaries. If there is
maturity mismatch, then it becomes necessary for ﬁnancial intermediaries to pe-
riodically reﬁnance their loans, and to set the appropriate rate on these loan they
then need to make projections of future market rates in setting current retail rates.
4.2 Our Approach
Based on our multi-period analysis in the previous section we modify the conven-
tional model. Let us consider our multi-period model based on (1)10
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It is easy to see by rearrangement that
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where Et∆shmrt+sh(h) = Etmrt+sh(h) mrt(h). If expectations fEt∆shmrt+sh(h)g
are stationary, they need not necessarily enter the error correction term in the
dynamic speciﬁcation of the model, which can be written as:










l=1 φl∆rrt−l(H) + εt.
(4)
Moreover, if the restriction α2 =  α1 is not imposed, there can be diﬀerent speeds
of adjustment to changes of the market rates in the previous periods and expected
future periods. If α2 = 0, it means that the expected changes of the money market
rate do not aﬀect the retail rate and the model (4) becomes a backward-looking
error-correction model.
10If we impose the restriction  = 1, then we get equation (1) from the previous section.
19In order to accommodate the uncertainty of ﬁnancial intermediaries about the
future path of the market rate, we substitute expectations with recursive out-of-
sample forecasts of the money market rate:










l=1 φl∆rrt−l(H) + ηt,
(5)
where ∆sh   mrt+sh|t(h) =   mrt+sh|t(h) mrt. The forecasts   mrt+sh|t(h) are generated
using two alternative models presented in Diebold and Li (2006): the dynamic
Nelson-Siegel model and the direct regression onto three principal components.
4.2.1 Nelson-Siegel Forecasts
Following Diebold and Li (2006) we estimate the level, slope and curvature factors



















































where the parameter λ = 0.0609 (as in Diebold and Li, 2006). The factors
(Lt,St,Ct) are modeled and forecast as a VAR(1) process. The sh-period-ahead
forecast of a market rate of maturity τ is
































20and matrices   Π0 and   Π1 are obtained by regressing (  Lt,   St,   Ct)′ on an intercept and
(  Lt−sh,   St−sh,   Ct−sh)′.
4.2.2 Direct Regression on Principal Components
For a comparison with the Nelson-Siegel model we consider an alternative fore-
casting model, which was also compared with the Nelson-Siegel model in Diebold
and Li (2006).
First, we perform a principal component analysis on the full set of money
market rates using the eigenvalue decomposition of the (N N) covariance matrix
  St = t−1 ∑t
s=1(Xs    Xt)(Xs    Xt)′, where Xs = (mrs(τ1),mrs(τ2),...mrs(τN))
′ and
  Xt = t−1 ∑T
s=1 Xs. Denote by   Qt = (  Q1t,   Q2t,   Q3t) three eigenvectors associated to
three largest eigenvalues of the matrix   St. The ﬁrst three principal components,
  Ft = (  F1t,   F2t,   F3t)′, are then deﬁned by   Ft =   Q′
tXt.
Second, the sh-period-ahead forecast of a market rate of maturity τ is computed
as
  mrt+sh|t(τ) =   a
h
0t +   a
h
1t   F1t +   a
h
2t   F2t +   a
h
3t   F3t,




3t) are obtained by regressing mrt(τ) onto an in-
tercept and the principal components (  F1t−sh,   F2t−sh,   F3t−sh)′.
4.2.3 Application of the Forecasting Methodology
In order to apply our methodology, we proceed in two stages. At the ﬁrst stage we
generate recursive out-of-sample forecasts of a selected money market rate. At the
second stage we estimate the dynamic pass-through equation, where expectations
of the money market rate are substituted by the forecasts generated at the ﬁrst
stage.
The two-stage procedure requires the division of the whole sample f1,2,...,Tg
into sub-samples. We use observations f1,2,...,T0g to get initial estimates of the
forecasting models and generate a ﬁrst set of out-of-sample forecasts, f∆sh   mrT0+h|T0(h),
21∆sh   mrT0+2h|T0(h),..., ∆sh   mrT0+H−1|T0(h)g. Then we recursively augment the sam-
ple by one observation, re-estimate the forecasting models and generate a new set of
forecasts f∆sh   mrt+h|t(h), ∆sh   mrt+2h|t(h),..., ∆sh   mrt+H−1|t(h)g for t = T0+1,...,T.
At the second stage we estimate the error-correction model (5) using observations
fT0,...,Tg.
The error correction model makes use of anticipated changes to short-term
money market rates, and it is important to make two statements about the in-
clusion of these terms. First, since retail rates are not aggregated using exact
maturities, we cannot determine the precise forecast horizon based on the matu-
rity H. This is less of a problem than it may ﬁrst appear, since in practice, the
performance of forecasting models deteriorates with the increase of the forecast-
ing horizon, so in cases where H is distant there is little gain from the inclusion
of forecasts as far ahead as H periods. We can demonstrate this by comparing
our forecasts with a random walk model, which shows that forecasts beyond some
horizon, ¯ H, do not outperform a random walk and add little meaningful informa-
tion on the direction of short term money market rates. Given these limitations,
we include only forecasts up to this horizon ¯ H, f∆sh   mrt+h|t(h), ∆sh   mrt+2h|t(h),...,
∆sh   mrt+  H|t(h)g, for which the mean square forecast error is smaller than for a
random walk.
Second, we note that forecasts of short-term market rates are generated using
much the same information, and they overlap, which could result in multicollinear-
ity problems in estimation. However, we use the innovations in the market rates
f∆sh   mrt+h|t(h), ∆sh   mrt+2h|t(h),..., ∆sh   mrt+  H|t(h)g and we assign declining weights











Therefore the inclusion of many forecasts of the innovations at horizons fh,2h,..., ¯ Hg
does not result in multicollinearity.
Then we estimate the model











l=1 φl∆rrt−l(H) + ηt,
where δ1 = α1β, δ2 = α2β, and κ = ν + α1µ. It implies that the estimate of the
long run pass-through coeﬃcient is   β =   δ1/  α1 and the estimate of the adjustment
coeﬃcient for forecasts is   α2 =   α1  δ2/  δ1.
A general-to-speciﬁc procedure based on the Bayesian criterion is applied to
select an optimal number of lags for given initial K and L and an optimal number
of forecasts for a given initial ¯ H. In order to avoid identiﬁcation problems, the
minimal number of forecasts equals two. The value of the discount factor γ is
chosen from the interval [0.9,0.999).
4.2.4 Futures
For comparison with the models considered above, we explore the possibility that
the ﬁnancial intermediary does not produce its own forecast of future market
rates but uses the market quoted futures rates. The futures based on 3-month
EURIBOR deposits are quoted on the Euronext exchange, and assuming the ex-
pectations hypothesis is maintained as studies by Kuttner (2001), Krueger and
Kuttner (1996), Rudebusch (2002), Bernoth and von Hagen (2004) and Bernanke
and Kuttner (2005) suggest, then these should provide accurate predictions of ac-
tual market rates. The drawback with futures is that there is not a quoted rate
for every maturity, and futures are available only up to 12-months ahead. There is
also some evidence that using futures as predictors of short rates may breakdown
in some circumstances. In our case we use the 3-month futures as these are the
most heavily traded futures in the euro area, and we use futures up to 12 months
ahead as we do with our forecasts. Our model in this case is











l=1 φl∆rrt−l(H) + ηt,
where the term ∆shmrft+sh|t(h) = mrft+sh|t(h) mrt is the sh-period change in the
market rate inferred from the rate in the futures market minus the current market
rate. The lag selection process and the discount rate using in the general-to-
speciﬁc procedure are the same as for the forecasting models above. This analysis
is undertaken only for the aggregate dataset.
5 Data
Our aggregate data comprise variables at a monthly frequency from January 1994
to July 2007 for France, Germany, Italy and Spain. We make use of monthly data
on interest rates from the harmonized monetary and ﬁnancial institutions’ inter-
est rate (MIR) dataset, January 2003 - July 2007, for euro area countries, which
is then spliced to the non-harmonized national retail interest rate (NRIR) data
to provide a suﬃcient sample for estimation back to January 1999.11 Harmonized
data from the MIR dataset oﬀers 31 interest rates for euro area countries, but only
extends backwards to January 2003. The NRIR dataset oﬀers fewer interest rates
but has a considerably longer time series for each rate in euro area countries. For
the purpose of this study, the MIR series are aggregated into the more coarsely de-
ﬁned NRIR categories using new business volumes as weights, which is a modiﬁed
approach to aggregation compared to the methods employed in Kok-Sørensen and
11It would also have been possible to extend the data forward beyond 2007. Initially we did
not do this because the disruption in interbank lending associated with the ﬁnancial crisis could
have produced a period of instability that would have undermined the empirical exercise. In
fact, as we discovered when we explored the results from the individual bank dataset reported
below where we had no choice but to use a sample extending to 2011, our results would have
been stable even in the period of disruption during the ﬁnancial crisis.
24Werner (2006).12;13 There are six categories of retail interest rates generated by
this method, including mortgage rates, short-term loans to enterprises, long-term
loans to enterprises, time deposit and current account rates, and consumer loans
to households, but not all these series are collected for all countries and years. We
investigate the ﬁrst four series in this paper.
The market rates used to indicate the cost of funds for these retail products
include euro area overnight rates (EONIA), EURIBOR rates from 1 to 12 month
maturity and bond yields from 2 to 10 years maturity. The Nelson-Siegel and
principal components methods we adopt use this information to provide forecasts
of 1-month and 3-month EURIBOR rates up to twelve months ahead. The Data
Appendix at the end of the paper reports the deﬁnitions of the interest rates used.
Futures series are collected from Datastream. These are continuous series of
futures prices calculated by Thomson Reuters using 3-month EURIBOR futures
traded at Euronext (LIFFE before 2002). The average of all future prices is used
to calculate the implied future rate.
The data for individual banks are provided by the Banque de France, giving
bank-level time series for 297 banks and credit institutions over the period January
2003 to December 2011. These data comprise interest rates on a) loans to non
12We are grateful to Christopher Kok-Sørensen and Thomas Werner for providing their dataset.
They explain in correspondence with the authors that ‘... the diﬀerence between the [former
method] and the new data set is that in the former when deriving the weights (in order to
aggregate the MIR categories to the less detailed NRIR categories) we used a combination of
new business (NB) volumes and outstanding amounts (OA). The OA volumes we applied in order
to create back series of the country-speciﬁc market rates, based on the notion that OA better
reﬂected maturity structures of loans granted/deposits taken before January 2003 (a period for
which we have no NB volume data).’
13Splicing MIR and NRIR retail rate categories may create a mixture of maturities in the
retail rates that induces a role for forecasts of interest rates, but as far as possible we have kept
short and long maturities apart. For example, mortgages are uniformly long, as are long-term
loans (more than ﬁve year to maturity). Short-term loans and time deposits are more mixed,
with maturities mostly between 1 and 5 years. Note however, that our market rates are very
short (1-month or 3-month) and forecasts are up to 12 months ahead, beyond which they have
little value. We believe we are being consistent with our theoretical argument in relating our
retail rates of various maturities to short maturity current and future market rates, because we
propose it is more realistic to model bank reﬁnancing with successive short rates than to assume
banks match maturities (which is not possible at all maturities).
25ﬁnancial corporations with initial rate ﬁxation of up to 1 year; b) loans to non
ﬁnancial corporations with initial rate ﬁxation over 1 year and up to 5 years; c)
loans to non ﬁnancial corporations with initial rate ﬁxation over 5 years; d) deposits
of households with agreed maturity (sole proprietorships excluded); e) deposits of
non ﬁnancial corporations with agreed maturity: and f) mortgage loans for house
purchase to households (sole proprietorships excluded). All interest rates are for
new business.
These six interest rates are available on a consistent basis for a fraction of the
297 banks in our dataset, but we have suﬃcient observations over individual banks
to construct a volume weighted aggregate measure for each instrument, and mea-
sures for banks separated into diﬀerent sizes by total assets. We can therefore com-
pare the mean value of pass through for very large (deposits>euro 1bn), large (euro
999.9mn>deposits>euro 100mn), medium-sized (euro 99.9mn>deposits>euro 10mn)
and small banks (deposits<euro 9.9mn).14
6 Results
We begin with results for all four major European countries, using the aggregate
data compiled from the NRIR-MIR datasets described in the previous section.
These provide evidence on the pass through, speed of adjustment and the impor-
tance of forecasts of future market rates. We then compare our ﬁndings with a
model using futures rates in place of generated expectations of market rates, and
conﬁrm our conclusions. Finally, to investigate the potential aggregation bias, we
take data for one of our countries (France) and re-estimate the models using in-
dividual bank data and compare the mean values of coeﬃcients on pass through,
speed of adjustment and forecasts of future market rates with results for aggregated
data. We ﬁnd no evidence that aggregated data oﬀer biased results.
14We are prohibited from reporting individual bank pass through or adjustment coeﬃcients for
reasons of conﬁdentiality, but the averages accurately summarise the responses of banks within
size categories.
266.1 Nelson-Siegel and Principal Components Forecasts
As the data are monthly, we report results for 1-month EURIBOR (h = 1) and
3-month EURIBOR (h = 3) in our model. One reason for reporting the 3-month
EURIBOR results alongside 1-month EURIBOR is that we can make comparisons
with the results using 3-month EURIBOR futures in the next section. We use
the data from January 1994 to January 1999 to obtain the ﬁrst estimates of the
forecasting models. The recursive out-of-sample forecasts are generated using the
data from January 1999 to July 2007. The relative mean square forecast errors
of the Nelson-Siegel and the principal component forecasts for up to 12 month
horizon for each money market rate are reported in Table 1. The forecasting
performance of these models for horizons beyond 12 months is worse than the
forecasting performance of a random walk model. It determines the choice of the
maximal horizon of forecasts used to estimate the pass-through equation, ¯ H = 12.
Table 2 reports estimates of the pass-through coeﬃcient, β. The results are
reported for 1-month EURIBOR in Panel A and 3-month EURIBOR in Panel B
for the model with Nelson-Siegel (NS) forecasts and for the model with principal
components (PC) forecasts. Standard errors are reported in parentheses under the
estimates of coeﬃcients.
Our results show ﬁrst of all that the choice of forecasting methodology does not
make a great deal of diﬀerence to the estimates of the long-run pass through. The
long run pass through coeﬃcient gives an indication of the extent to which changes
in the money market rates are transmitted to the retail rates oﬀered to households
and ﬁrms. If following changes to money market interest rates the adjustment
to retail rates is lower, then monetary policy has less impact on household and
ﬁrm behavior through the interest rate channel of monetary transmission through
coeﬃcients reported in Table 2. Pass through estimates from the Nelson-Siegel
methods are very close to the estimates from principal components methods and
the estimates are not greatly diﬀerent from each other when we examine a common
27retail rate across countries.15
Second, we see very similar degrees of pass through for the same retail product
across countries - time deposits and short-term loans to enterprises have pass
through coeﬃcients below one, while mortgages have coeﬃcients mostly above
one. These results are comparable to the results reported in de Bondt (2002)
where the average responses across the entire euro area for the post-1999 period
are comparable in magnitude to our estimates for individual countries, although
our pass through coeﬃcients are marginally higher.16 His reported coeﬃcients for
pass through on time deposits was 0.720, short-term lending to ﬁrms 0.880, long-
term lending to ﬁrms 0.804 and mortgages 1.041, all of which were signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, and with the exception of the mortgage rate were signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from one. Standard errors show that our estimates of pass through rates
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one. Results reported for individual countries by
Kok-Sørensen and Werner (2006) using panel data for the period from January
1999-June 2004 show estimates of pass through coeﬃcients very similar to ours,
and diﬀer to a similar extent between countries, even though they do not include
forward-looking terms.
The similarity of the results despite the omission of forward-looking terms can
be explained in two ways. Previous studies matched maturities of retail and market
rates which could implicitly allow for the future short-term rates in the longer ma-
turity rate assuming there is complete arbitrage; but there is some doubt whether
arbitrage is complete, and therefore these studies may have imperfectly allowed
for future short rates by using matched maturities in their models. Also, previ-
ous models may have compensated for missing forward-looking terms by adding
15There are a few exceptions to this rule, namely short-term loans to enterprises in Germany,
long-term loans to enterprises in France, and mortgages in Italy, which seem out of line with
estimates in other countries for these retail rates.
16The same paper reports estimates in the literature for individual countries, but these use
data mostly from the pre-1999 period, which are not comparable with our sample. Kok-Sorensen
and Werner (2006) note that there is a structural break in the estimates of pass through in the
euroarea before and after 1999. These authors note that pass through and adjustment speeds
are generally higher after 1999 than before 1999.
28longer lags of backward-looking dynamic terms in retail and market rates. This
choice is not theory driven, and is largely a matter of empirical model selection,
but while this might improve the ﬁt of the dynamic model it signiﬁcantly alters
its interpretation. These compensating factors may account to some degree for
the similarity in the pass through estimates even though the forecast is excluded.
The dynamic, hence short-run, behavior of the models can also be dramatically
diﬀerent depending upon whether forecasts are included or not, even though the
long run may be roughly the same.
Third, comparison between panels shows that estimates of pass through do not
diﬀer very much whether we use 1-month money market rates or 3-month money
market rates. Therefore, despite an intense debate about how best to choose the
appropriate maturity of market rates, the choice between these two short-maturity
rates seems to be relatively unimportant as far as the estimate of the pass through
coeﬃcient is concerned.
Table 3 reports the estimated coeﬃcient on the lagged retail rate in the dy-
namic equation. This is actually the estimated speed of adjustment of deviations
of the retail rate from the equilibrium implied by the lagged market rate rate.
Although we do not estimate the relationship between lagged retail and lagged
money market rates as a separate cointegrating relationship, the negative and sig-
niﬁcant coeﬃcient reported in Table 3 is consistent with the interpretation that
the variables are cointegrated.17
We would expect the speed of adjustment coeﬃcient to be negative and sig-
niﬁcant if the retail and market rates of interest are cointegrated, which it is in
every case in Panel A reporting the results for 1-month EURIBOR and in Panel
B reporting results for 3-month EURIBOR. Previous studies that have considered
the pass through of money market rates to retail rates (without including expected
changes to rates in the future) have typically reported regressions in which pass
17The reported estimates of the long run pass through coeﬃcient in Table 2 were obtained by
dividing the freely estimated coeﬃcient, 1, on the lagged money market rate, by the estimate of
the adjustment coeﬃcient, 1; reported in Table 3. It is therefore possible to impose a restriction
that 1rrt−1(H) + 1mrt−1(h) = 1(rrt−1(H)   mrt−1(h)):
29through is estimated using a cointegrating relationship between lagged retail and
money market rates, and the adjustment coeﬃcient is reported as the dynamic
response to the lagged residuals from this relationship. Examining the results of
Kok-Sørensen and Werner (2006) for example, their mortgage adjustment coeﬃ-
cients show Italy to have very fast adjustment speed relative to other countries,
as we do; similarly they ﬁnd the adjustment speeds for short- and long-term loans
to enterprises to be fast for Italy and Spain compared to France and Germany.
To an extent the similarity in the results is due to our common dataset, but our
sample is longer, and our methods diﬀer from those of Kok-Sørensen and Werner,
and most importantly we have included expected changes to rates in the future,
which we now show to be very important.18
The results in Table 4 give the estimated coeﬃcients on the forecasts in our
model. If these coeﬃcients could be restricted to equal zero we would deduce that
forecasts of future changes to market rates at that maturity were unimportant
for the dynamic adjustment of retail rates, but the evidence in Table 4 says they
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The ﬁndings for 1-month EURIBOR show
the coeﬃcients are very strongly signiﬁcant in all cases and they are uniformly
positive. This is what we would expect, since it tells us that as short-term money
market rates are expected to rise, so retail rates are adjusted upwards, and vice
versa. The results using 3-month EURIBOR are less consistent, but the majority
of cases have a positive coeﬃcient as expected, and in half of all cases (eight) the
coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant. The choice between NS and PC estimation
methods does not alter the conclusion about sign and signiﬁcance, and estimates
of the coeﬃcients are very similar.
Besides oﬀering a test of the importance of the forecasts in our model, the test
reported in Table 4 also evaluates whether the model without forecasts included
18Models that use selection algorithms similar to our own may attempt to compensate for the
omission of forecasts of market rates by including additional lags of retail and market rates. To
some extent this may enable them to match the properties of the data, but our later results show
that when using an information criterion there is a preference for the model with forecasts to
alternatives.
30can be rejected in favor of a model that includes forecasts. This is a test that
determines the preferred model speciﬁcation, and the results suggest that a model
without forecasts can be rejected compared to a model including forecasts.
In Table 5a we report this speciﬁcation search as a likelihood ratio test of model
in which the alternative to the model including forecasts is a nested version similar
in all respects except that it excludes the forecasts. The reported p-values show
that we reject the null that forecasts are insigniﬁcant in our model in all cases but
one at the 5% level.
While this is a feasible alternative to the model with forecasts it is not the
preferred alternative, since our selection algorithm chooses a diﬀerent model when
forecasts are excluded. In Table 5b we report the Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC) value for two alternative models selected by our algorithm - the ﬁrst includes
forecasts and the second does not, while lag structures for each model are diﬀerent.
On BIC criteria, taking 1-month EURIBOR as the market rate and Nelson-Siegel
forecasts, we ﬁnd that in 13 cases out of 16 the model with forecasts has a smaller
BIC value than the model without forecasts therefore in the majority of cases we
prefer the model with forecasts. We conclude that this test ﬁnds the additional
information provided by adding the forecasts of market rates suﬃciently great to
favor this model over the alternative that excludes forecasts.
We interpret these results as an indication that banks do not look very far
ahead when setting retail interest rates. The stronger evidence in favor of 1-month
forecasts compared to 3-month forecasts suggests they use information in 1-month
changes to rates rather 3-month changes, but in our model we allow for up to 12
leads of these 1-month changes, and four leads of the 3-month changes to short
rates. This is consistent with the evidence that banks were funding their lending
using short-term money market funding which was rolled over on a short-term
basis. What matters for a bank that operates in this way is the expected cost of
funding for the next period when reﬁnancing will be required. To anticipate the
results of the next section, we also ﬁnd that changes to rates indicated by 3-month
31futures are not particularly inﬂuential over changes to retail rates, which conﬁrms
the results reported here.
Table 6 tests whether we can impose a restriction that adjustment to deviations
of lagged retail rates from lagged money market rates is equal and opposite to the
adjustment to expected future changes to market rates i.e. α2 =  α1. In half of
the cases the reported p-value of the Likelihood Ratio test rejects the restriction,
and in the other half the restriction is not rejected. In cases where the coeﬃcient
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, the magnitude of the α2 coeﬃcient is much
larger than the corresponding coeﬃcient for α1, which indicates that more weight
is placed on future money market rates than on lagged cointegrating residuals.
But it is not essential to our argument that the response to these terms should be
the same, as indicated by the fact that these coeﬃcients have equal and opposite
signs. Our results from previous tables show that forecast changes in money market
rates (especially at the 1-month maturity but also at the 3-month maturity) are
important, and have the expected sign and signiﬁcance.
Finally, we investigate the possibility of structural breaks in our model using
the Cumulated Sum of Squares (CUSUM) test on model residuals for each retail
rate in each of the four European countries in our study. The null hypothesis of
the CUSUM test is the stability of the pass-through equation. The signiﬁcance
level is the probability of rejecting the null when it is true. We set the signiﬁcance
level at the conventional level of 5%. Our results are given in Figures 3-6 and
show for each of the four panels - representing time deposits, short- and long-term
loan rates, and mortgage rates - that none of the rates in France, Germany and
Italy reject the null, while in Spain there are rejections for all four retail rates.
These rejections do not occur at the same time, and the reason for the rejections
is probably related to the quality of the data. Despite the poor results for Spain,
the non-rejection for three other countries suggests that our models are reliable.
326.2 Use of Futures Rates
In this section we evaluate the results where we use 3-month futures in place of
forecasts to determine the importance of anticipated changes to market rates. It
has been common practice in the academic literature that supports the expec-
tations hypothesis (see for example Krueger and Kuttner, 1996; Kuttner, 2001;
Rudebusch, 2002; Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005) to argue that futures are good
predictors of what actual short-term rates will be. Moreover, Kopecky and Van-
Hoose (2012) have argued explicitly that futures may be a guide to expectations
about market rates and these could be used to measure how expectations inﬂuence
the retail rate setting by banks. To do this we consider 3-month EURIBOR fu-
tures compared to our ﬁndings with the two forecasting approaches using 3-month
EURIBOR reported in the previous section. As before we discuss the pass through
coeﬃcients, the adjustment coeﬃcients on the lagged retail rate, the coeﬃcient on
the future (used to determine the expected change in future market rates), and
the test of coeﬃcient restrictions within the model. The results for all retail rates
and countries in our sample are very similar to the results for 3-month EURIBOR
in the previous section, whether we compare with NS or PC forecasts.
The pass through coeﬃcients reported in Table 7 are similar in magnitude for
each retail rate and country and adjustment coeﬃcients are estimated to be nega-
tive and signiﬁcant in all cases. However, the expected changes to money market
rates using futures information are insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in eleven cases
out of sixteen, which shows weaker evidence of forward looking behavior based on
futures compared to our results from forecasts of the 3-month EURIBOR rates.
There are several reasons why this might be the case. There has been an emerging
literature that has cast doubt on the ability of futures to predict short term inter-
est rates (see Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005; Piazzesi and Swanson, 2008) since the
mean errors and mean square prediction errors (MSPEs) when using futures can
be large, with larger errors around turning points, and over-prediction of actual
short-term future rates in recessions and under-prediction in booms. It is also pos-
33sible that banks do not tend to use information from 3-month EURIBOR futures
when setting retail rates, either because they use some other indicator of future
short term market rates, or because they do not use changes in 3-month rates.
Whatever the reason, we do not ﬁnd that futures perform as well as forecasts in
our models of retail rate adjustment.
6.3 Results for Individual French Banks
We report in this subsection the results of pass through estimates, speed of ad-
justment coeﬃcients and coeﬃcients on forecast terms computed using data for
individual French banks. Neither the deﬁnitions of the variables, i.e. the aggre-
gate measures constructed from volume-weighted individual rates, nor the sample
period correspond exactly with the euro area data supplied by the NRIR-MIR
datasets. With respect to the former, the categories of instruments are ﬁner than
those available in the MIR dataset. Reaggregation to correspond with the MIR
categories is possible but was not recommended by the authorities at the Banque
de France. Therefore we report in this section the similarities and diﬀerences be-
tween pass through and adjustment coeﬃcients for banks of diﬀerent sizes versus
the aggregate measure as a means to determine the extent of any aggregation bias.
With respect to the latter we need to use data spans typically running to 2010:05,
in order to allow for a suﬃcient number of observations for estimation (given that
the data start at 2003:01, in contrast to the MIR dataset).
Table 8 reports the mean values of pass through coeﬃcient estimates by in-
strument computed for individual banks of diﬀerent sizes and the pass through
coeﬃcient for a volume-weighted aggregate measure. The results are reported in
two panels, the ﬁrst is for the EURIBOR 1-month market rate and the second for
the EURIBOR 3-month market rate. We consider the pass through for individual
banks which are summarized for banks within four size categories ranging from
very large (deposits>euro 1bn) to large (euro 999.9mn>deposits>euro 100mn),
medium-sized (euro 99.9mn>deposits>euro 10mn) and small banks (deposits<euro
349.9mn).19 Although the results are not directly comparable to the results for France
reported in the previous sub-sections, the pass through coeﬃcients for deposits are
below unity, and for loans are above unity for almost all bank groups and in aggre-
gate. The mean values of the coeﬃcients are not generally signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from one. The table shows that there is heterogeneity in the pass through be-
tween bank size classes, and this is also true between banks within each size class.
Figure 7 provides plots of the histograms of long-run pass through coeﬃcients for
the banks for the six diﬀerent categories of retail rates for each of the two market
rates (1 month and 3 month EURIBOR). The distributions in some cases appear
approximately Normal and have a distinct mode value, but there are a few cases
where the distribution is not Normal e.g. for time deposits of households.
It is evident that the pass through of the aggregate measure lies within the
range of the mean values for banks of diﬀerent sizes in almost every case (loans
to non-ﬁnancial companies is the only exception). The scale of the pass through
coeﬃcients are greater than unity but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one, and
given that the sample includes the ﬁnancial crisis it is possible that pass through
is greater than in ‘normal’ times. There is a similar correspondence between the
mean values of adjustment coeﬃcients for banks of diﬀerent sizes and the adjust-
ment coeﬃcient for the aggregate measure. The conclusion to be drawn from these
results is that responses of individual banks are very similar to responses in ag-
gregate data, suggesting that there is no systematic aggregation bias in the data
for France. The estimates over a diﬀerent sample period and a diﬀerent aggrega-
tion nevertheless point to a pass through coeﬃcient not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
unity, and an adjustment to deviations of retail rates from their implied equilib-
rium that is negative and signiﬁcant. The response to forecasts of future market
rates is positive and signiﬁcant.
In Table 9 we report the mean estimates of the adjustment coeﬃcient and the
coeﬃcient on the forecasts. As before the results are reported in two panels, Panel
19A reporting restriction within our conﬁdentiality agreement with the Banque de France
requires that we do not report individual bank results.
35A provides results for the EURIBOR 1-month market rate and Panel B for the
EURIBOR 3-month market rate. In all cases the adjustment coeﬃcient is negative
as expected, and the forecast coeﬃcient is positive as expected. Table 10 tests
whether these coeﬃcients can be restricted to be equal and opposite in sign, and
whether they can individually be restricted to equal zero. The results for diﬀerent
instruments in the various bank size classes shown in Panel A indicate that (at
the 5% level of signiﬁcance) for the majority of cases (86%) we reject the null that
the adjustment coeﬃcient equals zero, and we also reject the forecast coeﬃcient is
equal to zero in 60% of cases. For 3-month EURIBOR results reported in Panel B,
these ﬁgures drop to 63% and 35% respectively. Once again our individual bank
results uphold the ﬁndings we report for aggregate data in previous sub-sections,
and most importantly conﬁrm the importance of the forward looking terms.
7 Conclusions
A large number of empirical studies of the relationship between retail interest
rates and market rates have assumed there is a contemporaneous relationship
between these interest rates in levels. We argue that the literature has largely
ignored forecasts of rates that might be undertaken by banks when setting interest
rates. Since the inclusion of future rates would alter the equilibrium relationship
and the dynamics of the models used to evaluate the degree of interest rate pass
through, models that rely only on contemporary market rates to explain retail
rates downplay the importance of expected market rates that could help a bank
to deal with uncertainty surrounding the future market rate.
The paper oﬀers a simple theoretical framework to examine forward-looking
behavior by institutions, and introduces forecasts into models of interest rate set-
ting for European countries. It then produces forecasts based on Nelson-Siegel
and principal components methods to explain market rates, and these are then
used to estimate dynamic models for four diﬀerent retail rates in the four major
euro area countries. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant role for forecasts of future money market
36interest rates in pass through at 1-month and 3-month maturities. This seems
to be consistent with the practice before the ﬁnancial crisis of using short-term
money market funding to regularly reﬁnance lending of much longer maturities.
Given the importance of future expected short-term money market rates we sug-
gest this model provides a more realistic explanation of rate setting behavior by
banks, that acknowledges their attempts to reduce uncertainty about future mar-
ket rates. Our results for the four major euro area countries using aggregated data
are corroborated using data for individual banks in France.
Our work can be extended in several directions. Following Diebold et al. (2006)
it would be interesting to determine whether a wider range of data would improve
forecasts from factors using principal components methods. This would allow us
to consider the impact of monetary and macroeconomic variables as well as yield
curve information on expected future short term changes to money market rates.
It would also be interesting to explore the importance of the risk premium in our
model. Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) claim that futures produce poor forecasts
of market rates because they are correlated with, and uncorrected for, the risk
premium. Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) show that the correction can be made
using a vector of macro information known to market participants such as Non-
Farm Payroll employment, but surely a wider range of monetary and macro factors
might be expected to be better at capturing risk premium adjustments. These are
detailed changes that we leave for future research.
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41Table 1: Direct forecast comparison, relative mean
square forecast error, random walk benchmark






1 0.753 0.668 - -
2 0.700 0.649 - -
3 0.683 0.639 0.769 0.740
4 0.684 0.646 - -
5 0.701 0.674 - -
6 0.733 0.711 0.843 0.830
7 0.769 0.751 - -
8 0.811 0.796 - -
9 0.860 0.847 0.958 0.954
10 0.900 0.891 - -
11 0.955 0.949 - -
12 1.000 1.000 1.080 1.080
Note: The table provides a comparison of the mean square forecast errors of Nelson-Siegel and
Principal Component forecasts at horizons 1-12 months versus a random walk benchmark. Vlues
less than one indicate superior performance.
42Table 2: Estimates of the pass-through coeﬃcient, β
Panel A: 1-month EURIBOR
France Germany Italy Spain
NS PC NS PC NS PC NS PC
0.954 0.959 0.934 0.936 0.802 0.800 0.890 0.893 Time deposits
(0.017) (0.014) (0.004) (0.005) (0.012) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009)
Short-term loans 0.784 0.747 1.450 1.560 0.794 0.788 0.934 0.930
to enterprises (0.092) (0.082) (0.235) (0.254) (0.020) (0.019) (0.026) (0.027)
Long-term loans 1.450 1.430 0.749 0.738 0.805 0.789 0.733 0.720
to enterprises (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.054) (0.032) (0.031) (0.048) (0.046)
1.270 1.260 1.500 1.420 0.936 0.916 1.190 1.130 Mortgage loans
(0.077) (0.086) (0.065) (0.093) 0.024 (0.027) (0.046) (0.054)
Panel B: 3-month EURIBOR
France Germany Italy Spain
NS PC NS PC NS PC NS PC
0.969 0.969 0.937 0.937 0.810 0.806 0.895 0.891 Time deposits
(0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.016) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009)
Short-term loans 0.665 0.668 1.460 1.430 0.792 0.792 0.932 0.930
to enterprises (0.061) (0.060) (0.212) (0.199) (0.021) (0.020) (0.024) (0.024)
Long-term loans 1.490 1.470 0.724 0.709 0.769 0.769 0.716 0.726
to enterprises (0.060) (0.057) (0.049) (0.050) (0.031) (0.031) (0.046) (0.048)
1.340 1.330 1.630 1.590 0.929 0.927 1.210 1.200 Mortgage loans
(0.073) (0.070) (0.084) (0.072) (0.023) (0.024) (0.047) (0.048)
Note: The table provides estimates of the coeﬃcient β from equation (5) for 1-month and
3-month EURIBOR rates, using results from two diﬀerent forecasting methods (Nelson Siegel
and Principal Components). Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard
errors are provided in brackets.
43Table 3: Estimated adjustment coeﬃcient, α1
Panel A: 1-month EURIBOR
France Germany Italy Spain
NS PC NS PC NS PC NS PC
-0.190 -0.180 -0.330 -0.250 -0.230 -0.200 -0.300 -0.340 Time deposits
(0.093) (0.082) (0.076) (0.080) (0.086) (0.084) (0.064) (0.063)
Short-term loans -0.170 -0.180 -0.015 -0.014 -0.350 -0.350 -0.620 -0.610
to enterprises (0.070) (0.072) (0.010) (0.009) (0.033) (0.033) (0.091) (0.093)
Long-term loans -0.077 -0.076 -0.180 -0.190 -0.670 -0.660 -0.350 -0.330
to enterprises (0.017) (0.016) (0.031) (0.030) (0.060) (0.060) (0.100) (0.100)
-0.024 -0.022 -0.061 -0.045 -0.440 -0.400 -0.088 -0.077 Mortgage loans
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.044) (0.044) (0.019) (0.017)
Panel B: 3-month EURIBOR
France Germany Italy Spain
NS PC NS PC NS PC NS PC
-0.093 -0.093 -0.260 -0.240 -0.190 -0.180 -0.320 -0.330 Time deposits
(0.043) (0.043) (0.065) (0.063) (0.093) (0.093) (0.059) (0.060)
Short-term loans -0.250 -0.250 -0.015 -0.015 -0.360 -0.360 -0.770 -0.770
to enterprises (0.062) (0.062) (0.009) (0.009) (0.031) (0.031) (0.120) (0.120)
Long-term loans -0.065 -0.066 -0.180 -0.180 -0.680 -0.680 -0.340 -0.340
to enterprises (0.018) (0.018) (0.035) (0.035) (0.060) (0.060) (0.100) (0.100)
-0.021 -0.021 -0.038 -0.044 -0.460 -0.450 -0.090 -0.088 Mortgage loans
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.056) (0.057) (0.022) (0.023)
Note: The table provides estimates of the coeﬃcient α1 from equation (5) for 1-month and
3-month EURIBOR rates, using results from two diﬀerent forecasting methods (Nelson Siegel
and Principal Components). Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard
errors are provided in brackets.
44Table 4: Estimated adjustment coeﬃcient for forecasts, α2
Panel A: 1-month EURIBOR
France Germany Italy Spain
NS PC NS PC NS PC NS PC
0.750 0.450 0.680 0.350 0.510 0.440 0.700 0.280 Time deposits
(0.250) (0.150) (0.180) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.040)
Short-term loans 0.880 0.620 0.130 0.140 0.410 0.230 0.140 0.130
to enterprises (0.280) (0.180) (0.110) (0.087) (0.110) (0.073) (0.052) (0.052)
Long-term loans 0.160 0.170 0.800 0.650 0.950 0.810 0.520 0.690
to enterprises (0.040) (0.040) (0.110) (0.089) (0.210) (0.200) (0.190) (0.160)
0.290 0.210 0.670 0.590 0.930 0.760 0.360 0.390 Mortgage loans
(0.068) (0.047) (0.081) (0.081) (0.110) (0.100) (0.053) (0.048)
Panel B: 3-month EURIBOR
France Germany Italy Spain
NS PC NS PC NS PC NS PC
-0.013 -0.015 0.044 0.007 0.260 0.230 0.230 0.210 Time deposits
(0.020) (0.019) (0.040) (0.016) (0.088) (0.083) (0.055) (0.051)
Short-term loans -0.120 -0.094 0.075 0.074 0.049 0.048 0.140 0.130
to enterprises (0.220) (0.210) (0.041) (0.040) (0.036) (0.035) (0.078) (0.079)
Long-term loans 0.110 0.110 0.840 0.780 -0.051 -0.050 -0.120 -0.130
to enterprises (0.048 ) (0.050) (0.150) (0.140) (0.082) (0.082) (0.081) (0.097)
0.050 0.053 0.360 0.360 0.420 0.380 0.200 0.190 Mortgage loans
(0.033) (0.033) (0.078) (0.080) (0.093) (0.084) (0.032) (0.031)
Note: The table provides estimates of the coeﬃcient α2 from equation (5) for 1-month and
3-month EURIBOR rates, using results from two diﬀerent forecasting methods (Nelson Siegel
and Principal Components). Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard
errors are provided in brackets.
45Table 5a: Likelihood ratio tests, H0 : α2 = 0:, p-values
1-month EURIBOR, Nelson-Siegel forecasts
France Germany Italy Spain
Time deposits 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Short-term loans to enterprises 0.000 0.095 0.010 0.020
Long-term loans to enterprises 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.025
Mortgage loans 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: The table provides p-values for the Likelihood Ratio test that the unrestricted model
(including forecasts) can be rejected in favor of the restricted model (excluding forecasts) for the
estimate of equation (5) using 1-month EURIBOR and Nelson Siegel forecasts.
Table 5b: Bayesian information criterion,
1-month EURIBOR, Nelson-Siegel forecasts
Model France Germany Italy Spain
without forecasts -0.338 -1.117 -0.141 0.216
Time deposits
with forecasts -0.635 -1.606 -0.238 -0.029
without forecasts 1.290 -0.321 -0.460 0.823 Short-term loans
to enterprises
with forecasts 1.144 -0.294 -0.466 0.819
without forecasts 0.948 0.699 1.454 1.100 Long-term loans
to enterprises
with forecasts 0.801 0.295 1.390 1.129
without forecasts -1.499 0.356 0.347 -1.101
Mortgage loans
with forecasts -1.250 -0.104 0.112 -1.454
Note: The table provides Bayesian Information Criteria values for the unrestricted model (in-
cluding forecasts) versus the restricted model (excluding forecasts) for the estimate of equation
(5) using 1-month EURIBOR and Nelson Siegel forecasts.
46Table 6: Likelihood ratio test of α2 =  α1, p-values
Panel A: 1-month EURIBOR
France Germany Italy Spain
NS PC NS PC NS PC NS PC
Time deposits 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.177 0.030 0.056 0.002 0.140
Short-term loans
to enterprises
0.016 0.058 0.182 0.103 0.834 0.080 0.000 0.000
Long-term loans
to enterprises
0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.690 0.923 0.879 0.358
Mortgage loans 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000
Panel B: 3-month EURIBOR
France Germany Italy Spain
NS PC NS PC NS PC NS PC
Time deposits 0.064 0.055 0.000 0.000 0.802 0.968 0.068 0.019
Short-term loans
to enterprises
0.054 0.058 0.180 0.183 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Long-term loans
to enterprises
0.138 0.118 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004
Mortgage loans 0.182 0.141 0.000 0.000 0.442 0.291 0.000 0.000
Note: The table provides p-values for the Likelihood Ratio test of the restriction that α2 =
 α1 in equation (5) for 1-month and 3-month EURIBOR rates, using results from two diﬀerent
forecasting methods (Nelson Siegel and Principal Components).
47Table 7: Results for models including future Rates
Panel A: Estimates of the pass-through coeﬃcient, 
France Germany Italy Spain
Time Deposits 0.959 (0.014) 0.931 (0.008) 0.806 (0.059) 0.862 (0.017)
Short-Term Loans to Enterprises 0.619 (0.056) 1.680 (0.524) 0.787 (0.021) 0.925 (0.022)
Long-Term Loans to Enterprises 1.240 (0.055) 0.786 (0.022) 0.770 (0.033) 0.668 (0.036)
Mortgage Loans 1.150 (0.039) 1.240 (0.020) 0.944 (0.040) 1.24 (0.014)
Panel B: Estimated adjustment coeﬃcient, 1
France Germany Italy Spain
Time Deposits -0.098 (0.040) -0.260 (0.077) -0.100 (0.093) -0.300 (0.072)
Short-Term Loans to Enterprises -0.320 (0.058) -0.013 (0.010) -0.360 (0.033) -0.780 (0.120)
Long-Term Loans to Enterprises -0.089 (0.027) -0.450 (0.065) -0.690 (0.068) -0.450 (0.110)
Mortgage Loans -0.064 (0.012) -0.16 (0.028) -0.320 (0.057) -0.140 (0.034)
Panel C: Estimated adjustment coeﬃcient for forecasts, 2
France Germany Italy Spain
Time Deposits 0.005 (0.006) 0.007 (0.010) 0.006 (0.022) 0.053 (0.021)
Short-Term Loans to Enterprises -0.150 (0.082) -0.003 (0.007) 0.016 (0.022) 0.053 (0.040)
Long-Term Loans to Enterprises 0.077 (0.036) 0.450 (0.063) -0.022 (0.054) -0.180 (0.054)
Mortgage Loans 0.064 (0.016) 0.240 (0.045) 0.035 (0.032) 0.071 (0.015)
Panel D: Likelihood ratio test of 2 =  1, p-values
France Germany Italy Spain
Time Deposits 0.079 0.000 0.131 0.000
Short-Term Loans to Enterprizes 0.000 0.227 0.000 0.000
Long-Term Loans to Enterprises 0.473 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mortgage Loans 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: The table provides estimates of the pass through coeﬃcient (Panel A), adjustment coeﬃcient 1
(Panel B); adjustment coeﬃcient for forecasts 2 (Panel C) and tests of the restriction2 =  1 in
equation (5) for 1-month and 3-month EURIBOR rates, using 3-month EURIBOR futures in place of
forecasts of market rates. Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors are
provided in brackets.
48Table 8: Mean of estimated pass through for individual banks
1-month EURIBOR
Very Large Large Medium-sized Small
Banks Banks Banks Banks
Aggregate
Time deposits 0.8952 0.9224 0.9699 0.9916 1.0380
of households (n.a.) (0.1099) (0.2147) (0.1548) (0.1587)
Time deposits 0.9663 0.9345 0.9170 0.8845 0.9182
of enterprises (n.a.) (0.0748) (0.2416) (0.0733) (0.2036)
Short term (< 1 yr) 1.2292 1.2903 1.3527 1.3466 1.3298
loans to enterprises (0.1473) (0.0927) (0.1648) (0.2228) (0.1591)
Medium term (1-5 yrs) 1.3098 1.4888 1.2801 1.3562
loans to enterprises (n.a.) (0.4893) (0.7212) (0.6128)
Long term (>5 yrs) 1.3601 1.2686 1.6905 1.4191
loans to enterprises (0.0841) (0.3162) (0.6123) (0.3758)
1.3313 1.3083 1.4152 1.3319 Mortgages
(0.0669) (0.0995) (0.1963) (0.1211)
3-month EURIBOR
Time deposits 0.8964 1.0182 1.2087 1.0216 1.0815
of households (n.a.) (0.2022) (0.2920) (0.2186) (0.2031)
Time deposits 0.9391 0.9044 0.9176 0.9043 0.9175
of enterprises (n.a.) (0.0590) (0.0816) (0.1280) (0.0880)
Short term (<1 yr) 1.2465 1.2778 1.3617 1.441 1.3494
loans to enterprises (0.1009) (0.1031) (0.1630) (0.1759) (0.1568)
Medium term (1-5 yrs) 1.3810 1.5519 1.5191 1.5015
loans to enterprises (n.a.) (0.6002) (0.3921) (0.4666)
Long term (>5 yrs) 1.3989 1.3633 1.7076 1.2964
loans to enterprises (0.0677) (0.3112) (0.5406) (1.3011)
1.4042 1.3463 1.3935 1.3778 Mortgages
(0.0843) (0.0668) (0.1112) (0.0800)
Note:The table provides mean estimates of the coeﬃcient β from equation (5) for 1-month and
3-month EURIBOR rates, using results from Nelson Siegel forecasting methods, for groups of
individual banks in France. Empirical standard errors, computed from the estimated coeﬃcients
for each group of banks are provided in brackets.
49Table 9: Mean of adjustment speed (α1)
and forecast coeﬃcient (α2) for individual banks
1-month EURIBOR
Very Large Large Medium-sized Small
Banks Banks Banks Banks
Aggregate
Time deposits 1 -0.1989 -0.1572 -0.2803 -0.3106 -0.2920
of households 2 0.2268 0.3179 1.0206 0.4598 0.5948
Time deposits 1 -0.5924 -0.3807 -0.4282 0.2796 -0.4083
of enterprises 2 0.3171 0.2140 1.1042 0.4696 0.8621
Short term (<1 yr) 1 -0.2576 -0.3277 -.3231 -0.3292 -0.3213
loans to enterprises 2 0.4406 0.3043 0.4408 0.8107 0.4731
Medium term (1-5 yrs) 1 -0.2098 -0.1686 -0.1436 -0.1566
loans to enterprises 2 0.4411 0.2897 0.3491 0.3241
Long term (>5 yrs) 1 -0.1520 -0.1128 -0.0903 -0.1011
loans to enterprises 2 0.2579 0.3134 0.2168 0.2715
1 -0.0541 -0.0599 -0.1010 -0.0659 Mortgages
2 0.1287 0.1349 0.1135 0.1299
3-month EURIBOR
Time deposits 1 -0.1941 -0.1539 -0.2382 -0.3255 -0.2799
of households 2 0.2299 0.5182 0.5182 0.7047 0.5746
Time deposits 1 -0.7080 -0.2679 -0.3963 -0.3820 -0.3699
of enterprises 2 3.2706 0.6477 0.6052 0.2913 0.7279
Short term (<1 yr) 1 -0.2476 -0.2967 -0.3179 -0.3213 -0.3099
loans to enterprises 2 0.4731 1.2473 0.5533 0.4325 0.6797
Medium term (1-5 yrs) 1 -0.2442 -0.1861 -0.1809 -0.1864
loans to enterprises 2 0.5713 0.4721 0.5556 0.5063
Long term (>5 yrs) 1 -0.1586 -0.1283 -0.0935 -0.1114
loans to enterprises 2 0.2853 0.3254 0.2578 0.2511
1 -0.0554 -0.0593 -0.1159 -0.0684 Mortgages
2 0.1263 0.0852 0.3925 0.1477
Note: The table provides mean estimates of the coeﬃcients α1and α2 from equation (5) for
1-month and 3-month EURIBOR rates, using results from Nelson Siegel forecasting methods,
for groups of individual banks in France.
50Table 10: Median of p-values for
H0 : α1 =  α2, H′
0 : α1 = 0, H′′
0 : α2 = 0, individual banks
1-month EURIBOR
Very Large Large Medium-sized Small
Banks Banks Banks Banks
Aggregate
H0 0.9170 0.0581 0.0330 0.1864 0.0917 Time deposits
H′
0 0.0000 0.0174 0.0252 0.0346 0.0000 of households
H′′
0 0.0246 0.0652 0.0465 0.1044 0.0617
H0 0.0154 0.0473 0.0202 0.0243 0.0206 Time deposits
H′
0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0160 0.0000 of enterprises
H′′
0 0.0018 0.1900 0.0068 0.0000 0.0008
H0 0.2270 0.4772 0.1573 0.0492 0.1573 Short term (< 1 yr)
H′
0 0.0368 0.0048 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 to enterprises
H′′
0 0.0252 0.0369 0.0296 0.0195 0.0297
H0 0.0019 0.1771 0.1180 0.1436 Medium term (1-5 yrs)
H′
0 0.0000 0.0000 0.2198 0.2198 to enterprises
H′′
0 0.0004 0.0646 0.0409 0.0468
H0 0.1284 0.1048 0.3196 0.1636 Long term (>5 yrs)
H′
0 0.0000 0.0008 0.0467 0.0680 to enterprises
H′′
0 0.0493 0.0630 0.1992 0.0900
H0 0.1366 0.2177 0.3087 0.2238
Mortgages H′
0 0.0000 0.0013 0.1254 0.0014
H′′
0 0.0378 0.0999 0.1448 0.1041
51Table 10 continued
3-month EURIBOR
Very Large Large Medium-sized Small
Aggregate
Banks Banks Banks Banks
H0 0.7993 0.1156 0.1124 0.0910 0.1182 Time deposits
H′
0 0.0004 0.0099 0.0296 0.0065 0.0004 of households
H′′
0 0.0476 0.0450 0.0943 0.0761 0.0768
H0 0.0013 0.5255 0.0910 0.0905 0.1956 Time deposits
H′
0 0.0000 0.0005 0.0008 0.0000 0.0008 of enterprises
H′′
0 0.0000 0.2752 0.0358 0.1888 0.0691
H0 0.1296 0.4136 0.2371 0.2188 0.2753 Short term (< 1 yr)
H′
0 0.1080 0.0135 0.0088 0.0023 0.0088 loans to enterprises
H′′
0 0.0278 0.0699 0.0359 0.0449 0.0443
H0 0.0004 0.1075 0.0495 0.0521 Medium term (1-5 yrs)
H′
0 0.0000 0.0003 0.0371 0.0371 loans to enterprises
H′′
0 0.0001 0.0666 0.0538 0.0609
H0 0.1898 0.1049 0.3196 0.1626 Long term (> 5 yrs)
H′
0 0.0000 0.0000 0.1014 0.1083 loans to enterprises
H′′
0 0.0994 0.0724 0.2329 0.1054
H0 0.1640 0.2844 0.2936 0.2755
Mortgages H′
0 0.0000 0.0006 0.1342 0.0006
H′′
0 0.2382 0.2071 0.2268
Note: The table provides median p-values in tests of the hypotheses that H0 : α1 =  α2,
H′
0 : α1 = 0, H′′
0 : α2 = 0 from equation (5) for 1-month and 3-month EURIBOR rates,
using results from Nelson Siegel forecasting methods, for groups of individual banks in France.
52Data Appendix
Retail interest rates*
Type of product Source
Time deposits European Central Bank
Short-term loans to enterprises European Central Bank
Long-term loans to enterprises European Central Bank
Mortgage loans European Central Bank
*The rates a calculated using the same methodology for Germany,
France, Italy, and Spain (see Sorensen and Werner (2006))
Money market interest rates
Type of product Source
1-month Euribor European Central Bank
3-month Euribor European Central Bank
6-month Euribor European Central Bank
12-month Euribor European Central Bank
2-year government benchmark bond European Central Bank
3-year government benchmark bond European Central Bank
5-year government benchmark bond European Central Bank
7-year government benchmark bond European Central Bank
10-year government benchmark bond European Central Bank
53Banque de France data
Data at a monthly frequency at the level of individual banks were made available to us for 297
banks and credit institutions for France for the products given below. The time span of the data
is in general January 2003 until December 2011 although complete runs of data are in large part
not available. For each type of product, in order to avoid potential complications arising from
interpolation, in the estimation we have used banks for which complete runs of data exist from
January 2003 until the early part of 2010 (January or May 2010). This allows us to work with
a suﬃcient number of banks in each category of product and since the banks are drawn from
across the size spectrum (deﬁned according to volumes of loans) we do not expect any distortion
of the results from this selection process. The span of data is kept as long as possible in order
to ensure precision in estimation.
Retail interest rates for French banks
Type of product Source
Time deposits with agreed maturity of households
(sole proprietorships excluded): new business
Banque de France
Time deposits with agreed maturity of non ﬁnancial
corporations: new business
Banque de France
Loans to non ﬁnancial corporations, up to 1 year
initial rate ﬁxation: new business
Banque de France
Loans to non ﬁnancial corporations, over 1 year
and up to 5 years initial rate ﬁxation: new business
Banque de France
Loans to non ﬁnancial corporations, over 5 years
initial rate ﬁxation: new business
Banque de France
Lending for house purchase to households (Mortgages)
(sole proprietorships excluded): new business
Banque de France




























55Figure 3: Results of CUSUM tests, France
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Figure 4: Results of CUSUM tests, Germany
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56Figure 5: Results of CUSUM tests, Italy
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Figure 6: Results of CUSUM tests, Spain
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57Figure 7: Histograms of pass-through coeﬃcients
based on French bank-level data
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1 MONTH EURIBOR TO RATES ON LOANS TO NON−FINANCIAL
CORPORATIONS, 1−5 YEARS INITIAL RATE FIXATION     











3 MONTH EURIBOR TO RATES ON LOANS TO NON−FINANCIAL
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1 MONTH EURIBOR TO RATES ON LOANS TO NON−FINANCIAL
CORPORATIONS, OVER 5 YEARS INITIAL RATE FIXATION  
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58Figure 7 continued: Histograms of pass-through coeﬃcients based on
French bank-level data
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